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January 2023

THE “GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY”  
IN U.S. POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE

At the beginning of the 1930s, two successive U.S. presidents, Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) and Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1933-1945), determined that dollar diplomacy and military intervention were failed policies undermining the otherwise successful growth of the Pan American Union. Both declared their intention for the United States to *resume* the role of the “good neighbor.” The stock market crash of October 1929 and the subsequent worldwide economic disaster, the “American Depression” as it was known outside the United States, derailed Hoover’s effort to improve U.S. relations with Latin America, but Roosevelt declared as he took office as president that the “Good Neighbor Policy” was one of his highest priorities. This chapter examines three issues central to the Good Neighbor Policy as a topic for historians of the United States: (1) the problems in inter-American relations that required official declarations of an intent to be a “good neighbor”; (2) the features of the Good Neighbor Policy that distinguished Roosevelt’s approach; (3) the internal political disputes surrounding the Good Neighbor Policy, disputes that eventually made the policy unsustainable.

*The Good Neighbor Policy as pledge of “non-intervention”*

In his inaugural address of March 4, 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt stated, “In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others—the

neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors.”<sup>1</sup> The phrasing presents universal platitudes regarding relations with all countries. Not a single word in Roosevelt’s address was specific to, or even directly mentioned inter-American relations. The Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State likewise defines the Good Neighbor Policy as a commitment to end intervention without reference to geography and quotes a later address Roosevelt delivered in December 1933 to identify the salient feature of his approach: “The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.”<sup>2</sup> When Roosevelt became president the occupations of Nicaragua (1912-1933) and Haiti (1915-1934) had long been notorious examples of U.S. armed intervention, but the occupation of the Dominican Republic (1915-1924), and multiple interventions over the previous three decades in Cuba (1898-1902, 1906-1908, 1917-1922), Honduras (1903, 1907, 1911, 1912, 1919, 1924, 1925), and Mexico (1914, 1916-1917) poisoned U.S. relations with all other American republics. Roosevelt, like Hoover before him, was convinced that a declaration pledging a policy of “non-intervention” had become vital to maintaining U.S. dominance in the western hemisphere.

The phrase “good neighbor” had long been a commonplace in U.S. political rhetoric. When Henry Clay, Secretary of State from 1825 to 1829, spoke of the newly independent nations of the western hemisphere living together as good neighbors, his phrase assumed that republics naturally seek cooperation while dynastic regimes generate imperial competition and a continuous state of warfare. In the 1860s, the U.S. press described military and financial aid to the forces of Benito Juárez fighting the French occupation of Mexico as the necessary obligations of a good neighbor who rejoices in the successes of their friends and helps them get

through their troubles. In 1881, in the invitation inviting the sovereign states of the western hemisphere to participate in a pan-American conference to be held in Washington, Secretary of State James G. Blaine stated, “By enlisting good will and promoting cooperation, the states of the western hemisphere could actively reject war and settle their disagreements as ‘good neighbors.’”<sup>3</sup>

I view the term “good neighbor” as, to use Reinhart Koselleck’s terminology, a “horizon of expectation” within which the interplay of hopes and fears shaped discussions of policy options and preparations for action.<sup>4</sup> A horizon of expectation is about social relationships and how to manage them. It motivates a repertoire of responses to the ups and downs of living and working with others. A horizon of expectation shapes assumptions about what others will do, while suggesting a range of situation-specific reactions to perform in return. To the degree that politics is a zone of chaos with perpetually conflicting and often unpredictable forces at play, the worldview inherent to a horizon of expectations may be the most stable element in a given historical situation because it provides keywords, protocols, and routines to which busy people can turn when uncertain about what to do next. The “horizon of expectation” makes visible tacit assumptions and ambitions motivating policies.

The idea of the “good neighbor” appeared regularly in the speeches and publications of Elihu Root, Secretary of State from 1904 to 1909 and chief architect of the Pan American Union. While Root used the term in relation to inter-American relations, the phrase appears more frequently in discussions of political and economic developments purely internal to the United States. In Root’s perspective, the historic project of the United States was to put citizens whose disparate interests were often in conflict into institutional structures whose basic operations

trained them to be “good neighbors” with each other. From this perspective, the Pan American Union (PAU) necessarily had a “civilizing mission,” but Root conceived the PAU’s activities as a shared responsibility that complemented the civilizing mission that each national government, the United States included, had undertaken to “improve” their countries by pursuing, to use Elihu Root’s words, “peace and righteousness as the basis for wealth and prosperity, in place of the policy of force, of plunder, of conquest, as the means of acquiring wealth.”<sup>5</sup> Prior to Franklin Roosevelt, no U.S. leaders had ever advocated a *policy* of being “good neighbors.” International cooperation and peaceful resolution of differences were taken for granted as obviously positive pieties. National leaders and their publics would necessarily have differing opinions about how best to achieve desired ends. At the same time, of course, the hope to live as “good neighbors” necessarily provokes constant anxieties about bad neighbors and what to do about them. Countries failing to operate “reasonably” needed to be returned to a state of good governance—as defined by U.S. leaders. This had been the rationale for the 1904 “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine whereby Theodore Roosevelt asserted a right for the United States to intervene in the internal disputes of other American countries if necessary to restore “administrative and fiscal order.”

With the result that in the first decades of the twentieth century, as Pan American Union programs grew in size and complexity, the United States simultaneously became a particularly oppressive neighbor, using its military and economic power to intervene in multiple countries. Military occupations were costly however and proved ineffective by every possible measure. They were unpopular inside the United States as well as across Latin America. In 1928, Franklin Roosevelt published an article in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs* in which he outlined the

foreign policy objectives of a future Democratic Party administration. He argued that U.S. interests in every part of the world required a credible pledge of non-intervention.<sup>6</sup> Roosevelt's convictions that interventions undermined broader U.S. foreign policy goals were shared by others, including Republicans Elihu Root, at the time serving as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Herbert Hoover, a retired mining executive who was Secretary of Commerce before being elected president of the United States in 1928. One of Hoover's first acts after his election was to tour Latin American capitals, where at each stop, he publicly pledged that the United States would be a "good neighbor" and no longer intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.<sup>7</sup> In a four-point program for improving inter-American relations, Hoover renounced the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine; directed embassies and consulates that U.S. diplomatic personnel were no longer to give priority to assisting U.S. enterprises with their commercial activities in Latin America; pledged to renegotiate the U.S. treaty with Cuba and repeal the Platt Amendment, which restricted Cuba from entering into treaties with other nations and conceded the United States the right to intervene in Cuban political affairs; and promised that as soon as the political parties of Haiti and Nicaragua elected civilian governments, he would transfer governing authority to those governments and withdraw all U.S. military personnel.

Despite the priority Hoover initially gave to pan-Americanism, the deepening global depression and a 25 percent unemployment rate in the United States became his most urgent problems. The passage of a restrictive tariff bill in 1930, intended to stimulate domestic production by drastically reducing foreign trade, was particularly devastating for the economies of Latin America, as congressional leaders ignored Hoover's urgent pleas to exempt Canada and

the member states of the Pan American Union. As a result, inter-American relations, already contentious, grew worse during Hoover's administration. Franklin Roosevelt began his administration determined to complete the reform of U.S. policy in the western hemisphere that Hoover had started. He reaffirmed Hoover's four major goals and achieved all of them in the first two years of his presidency. From the perspective of Latin American leaders, Roosevelt's executive orders exempting member states of the Pan American Union from most tariff restrictions were equally important steps in improving inter-American relations. With the passage of the Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934, Roosevelt's preferential treatment for PAU countries was consolidated and expanded. The legislation, justified as a measure to increase employment within the United States, authorized the president to reduce or eliminate tariffs on products from countries that reduced tariffs on U.S. products or offered equivalent concessions. Roosevelt's focus on reopening trade and investment alleviated the economic disasters of the early 1930s that plagued every country in the PAU, reinforced the good will he had earned from ending the occupations of Haiti and Nicaragua, and, not incidentally given that European countries continued to restrict access to their markets, increased U.S. share of trade and investment in each and every country.

Roosevelt understood that U.S. interventions across the Caribbean basin symbolized but did not exhaust the problem in the U.S. relationship with other PAU countries. The most significant irritant in inter-American relations had long been the turmoil that the transition to closer involvement with the U.S. economy generated. Perhaps because of his faith that market forces eventually correct all injustices, Hoover was unable to tackle the deeper problems that frustrated U.S. plans for integration of the western hemisphere into a political, economic, and

military alliance. Franklin Roosevelt had a better grasp of the relation between economic and political problems. The Reciprocal Trade Act gave him the tools to negotiate with other countries to find solutions to the unique difficulties each nation had with the United States. The Good Neighbor Policy, despite its official focus on foreign military interventions, developed into an integral part of New Deal economic planning and his administration's agenda for correcting the inequities and instabilities in U.S. society that the Great Depression had revealed.

*What was distinctive about the Good Neighbor Policy?*

Most historians of U.S. foreign relations have agreed that the Latin American policies of Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt had many more continuities than differences. At the same time, the connection between the New Deal and Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy was obvious to observers in the 1930s and 1940s. For those who supported the New Deal, Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy offered a model for a restructured system of liberal, market-based global governance, such as took shape at the end of World War II. The earliest studies of Roosevelt's inter-American policies stressed their success as a "democratization" of foreign policy.<sup>8</sup> An educational pamphlet that well-known Latin Americanist Lewis Hanke produced for the American Historical Association started with the vital question of whether intervention or cooperation more truly characterized U.S. foreign policy, as if the two were necessarily mutually exclusive. His argument fit wartime ideological imperatives of building an international coalition to fight Germany and Japan. He concluded that the initial U.S. conception of pan-Americanism had introduced a new standard of cooperation into international affairs, which previously had been organized around imperial rivalries and recurrent subordination of smaller polities to the demands of larger powers. Given its novelty, cooperation proved difficult to

maintain in practice. The Good Neighbor Policy was a necessary corrective that resumed a fragile and still uncertain experiment, the success of which was imperative for lasting world peace.

Hanke's position predicted the focus of many studies of the Good Neighbor Policy appearing after World War II. With the Cold War redefining the management of international conflict, many postwar analyses of the Good Neighbor Policy examined inter-American relations to gain better understanding of how economic, political, and "security" matters were linked.<sup>9</sup> Even the many defenses of the Good Neighbor Policy conceded that the U.S. government had failed in the goal of building a permanent inter-American alliance as the anchor of the postwar international system. The explanations of failure, indeed even the basic definition of what had failed, varied widely. The question of whether U.S. leaders had ever truly renounced intervention reemerged, in response to the influential arguments of William Appleman Williams and Gabriel Kolko that U.S. foreign policy was fundamentally imperialistic.<sup>10</sup>

A parallel but distinct question was determining the relation of corporate and state interests in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Bryce Wood's book *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (1961) argued that pan-Americanism initially focused on increasing commercial exchange. Cultural exchange grew into an increasingly important part of the project, particularly after 1915, as educational institutions and other elements from civil society became involved in the PAU. From 1889 to 1929, the U.S. government primarily played a minor coordinating role for U.S. citizens interested in promoting greater inter-American activity. The government spent minimal amounts of money on pan-American activities, with U.S. philanthropies providing more money for PAU projects than all the member state governments together. Bryce associated the



“Good Neighbor Policy” with both the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations, which together, he claimed expressed in the foreign policy arena the emergence of the U.S. national state as an autonomous, self-determining social force. During these two administrations, the U.S. national government came to understand itself as the guardian of “national interest” rather than of the diverse private interests U.S. citizens pursued. The New Deal and Roosevelt’s formulation of the Good Neighbor Policy recognized, indeed took for granted, the contradictory nature of private interest. Because the citizens are seldom if ever being able to agree on any question, a robust administrative state serves a unified nation by providing practical working definitions of the common good. The New Deal established the “common good” governing domestic policy, the Good Neighbor Policy for foreign policy. For this reason, the Good Neighbor Policy, although grounded in inter-American relations, had to be stated in universal terms; it provided the starting point for all U.S. international relations. Private interests resented the curtailing of powers and privileges Roosevelt’s innovations required. The most important U.S. businesses had grown in size to be world powers stronger than all but a handful of nations. The breadth of their resources threatened democratic institutions, thus they needed to be trained to acquiesce to state determination of national interest. In exchange, businesses would enjoy increased profits from the opportunities state policy opened for them. In terms of domestic policy, the New Deal articulated a revolutionary change in national governance by making government regulation a structural condition for all personal and private activities, rather than a set of ad hoc tactical solutions to particular problems. In terms of foreign policy, the transformation involved an even more radical break with tradition. Although foreign policy, in Bryce’s opinion, always had taken security issues into account, after the U.S. Civil War U.S. diplomats were primarily dedicated to

assisting the international operations of U.S. business interests, with federal officials seldom questioning specific goals set by the individuals seeking new markets or investment opportunities. Study of the Good Neighbor Policy was thus necessary to understand the process between 1930 to 1945 by which U.S. officials came to take charge of aspects of international relations previously handled primarily by businesses and civil society.<sup>11</sup>

In the 1930s, leaders of the other American states had a more basic question: what did Roosevelt's apparent pledge of "non-intervention" actually mean in practice. The first major test came in September 1933, six months after Roosevelt became president, when a revolutionary movement in Cuba overthrew the dictatorship of Gerardo Machado. U.S. property owners pressed Roosevelt to invoke the Platt Amendment and send in U.S. military forces to protect their properties. Roosevelt rejected that request, but as Sumner Welles, assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, quipped, no one ever intended that the pledge of "non-intervention" should ever stand in the way of a little "interference." In Cuba, where the possibility of another U.S. military occupation weighed on everyone, U.S. diplomats manoeuvred people they trusted into positions of authority in the new government to replace those they suspected of being so anti-Yanqui they were not ready to sit down and negotiate differences. In the Roosevelt administration, availability to making a deal quickly became the litmus test for the Latin American leaders U.S. officials trusted and were willing to help. In the aftermath of the revolution of 1933, both the U.S. and the new Cuban government needed to claim that relations between the two countries were being made fair and equal. The two parties quickly negotiated a new treaty that annulled the odious Platt Amendment.<sup>12</sup>

The second and considerably more significant test of U.S. commitment to non-

intervention came in 1938 when President Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico nationalized the petroleum industry. Roosevelt acknowledged Mexico's right to nationalize whatever industry it chose, but asked for fair compensation for U.S. citizens who lost their property. To assure that the request for compensation be taken seriously, the United States blocked imports of petroleum from Mexico until the two countries reached a framework for negotiation. As the United States at the time was the largest oil producer in the world and imported very little in the way of petroleum products, the step was more symbolic than punitive. The U.S. government agreed with the Mexican government that the valuations U.S. oil companies claimed were egregiously inflated. Prolonged negotiations concluded in 1943 with U.S. oil companies receiving 42 cents for every dollar they claimed they had lost. British oil companies, long the dominant force in Mexico's petroleum industry, received not a single penny, for the British government refused negotiations and attempted to organized an international boycott of Mexican goods, a foolish policy in the absence of U.S. support.<sup>13</sup>

The Roosevelt administration also decided not to protest military coups overthrowing the newly elected civilian governments of Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. The administration disapproved of these developments and, to show its displeasure with the Somoza and Trujillo regimes, reduced assistance to both countries. As the likelihood of a new world war increased and security concerns took greater priority, assistance increased in an effort to make sure neither dictator was tempted to turn to Germany.<sup>14</sup> U.S. policy makers had no intention of returning as occupiers in order to defend an abstract principle of liberal democracy. The proponents of the Good Neighbor Policy came to accept that in some countries, perhaps in many countries, dictatorship was preferable to either "disorder" or U.S. occupation. Dictatorship given

contending forces within a country might from the perspective of a U.S. preference for “no surprises” and a relatively stable negotiating partner be the best possible governance available.

Roosevelt’s approach required officials in his administration to listen more attentively to their counterparts in other American countries, as well as to elites whose attitudes towards the United States would shape longterm relations; to develop a better understanding of problems, priorities, and perspectives as seen by a country’s leading citizens; and then to use this information to explore deals that might be beneficial to the political interests of everyone involved. Democracy remained an ideal that U.S. leaders invoked rhetorically. The Roosevelt administration preferred to work with duly elected leaders like Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico or Pedro Aguirre Cerda in Chile, but found President Getúlio Vargas of Brazil a dictator who was ready to negotiate, often making difficult demands because Vargas was a “responsible” dictator with recognizable constituencies he had to satisfy. Nationalism was acceptable and indeed praise-worthy, as long as no competing foreign powers received “preferential” (or even equal) treatment.

U.S. leaders took it for granted that they always had something of value they could exchange with foreign leaders for something U.S. leaders wanted. The distinction between U.S. policy to Brazil and Argentina in the late 1930s and early 1940s is instructive, given that both governments were nationalistic and authoritarian. Washington decided that Argentina’s leaders were perversely resistant to compromise and deal-making.<sup>15</sup> As a result, U.S. attitudes towards Argentina were generally hostile and punitive. During the war, for example, the U.S. government frequently refused to approve normal commercial export of many U.S. products to Argentina on the grounds that they were needed elsewhere for the war effort.<sup>16</sup> Vargas, on the

other hand, was a man U.S. leaders could work with, and U.S. leaders strove to respect Brazilian demands while providing funding for key Brazilian development goals, such as the Volta Redonda project.<sup>17</sup> Products refused to Argentina were regularly approved for shipment to Brazil. U.S. public officials, particularly those on the ground in Brazil, were under instruction from Washington that they were to avoid irritating their Brazilian counterparts, while U.S. officials in Argentina were publicly critical of many decisions that the Argentinean government made, even if usually staying within the terms of conventional diplomatic language. Mexico received preferential treatment comparable to Brazil. Support given to PEMEX to stabilize and upgrade Mexican petroleum production after nationalization proved important for U.S.-Mexico collaboration during World War II satisfying U.S. expectations. Mexican labor was vital for U.S. agricultural production. To maintain the “Bracero” agreement that managed a continuous flow of temporary workers from Mexico into the United States, U.S. officials did not object to restrictions the Mexican government placed on the operations of the agricultural labor program in Texas after Mexican officials determined that police and courts in the state routinely mistreated Mexican citizens.<sup>18</sup>

A process emphasizing flexibility and negotiation was never seamless. Not all U.S. agencies had leaders with the requisite patience. Officials were often prickly about the institutional autonomy of their organizations, believing that as professionals they had a better grasp of what was happening on the ground than politicians. The U.S. military usually resisted changing their policies to comply with the deals the White House and the State Department had negotiated. They strongly opposed Brazilian and Mexican naval forces taking the lead in patrolling the oceans off their national coastlines. The U.S. Army did not want Brazilian army

units participating in the Italian campaign or the Mexican air force participating in the Philippines campaigns, claiming their involvement would distract U.S. forces and slow down the offensives. President Roosevelt personally overrode his military advisers, who by the end of the war agreed that Mexican and Brazilian military forces had fought with distinction and their participation freed up U.S. forces for other tasks. Relations with Mexico and Brazil were strategically important and in general U.S. officials were determined to resolve problems rather than insist on compliance with U.S. preferences.

In other countries, for a variety of reasons, U.S. officials at times decided against supporting an allied leader's requests.<sup>19</sup> Often U.S. domestic political considerations limited what Roosevelt's officials were able offer their American partners. The association of sugar growers in the United States strongly opposed all agreements that would allow foreign-produced sugar to enter the U.S. market more easily. Tobacco interests opposed agreements making it easier to import cigarettes and other tobacco products. Almost any trade agreement had potential opponents as well as beneficiaries within the United States. As in the United States, many Latin American leaders had to deal with the complications of shifting political alliances. After the death of Aguirre Cerda, U.S. relations with Chile turned unexpectedly negative. In 1942, Juan José Ríos, who succeeded Aguirre Cerda as president of Chile, decided the political situation in Chile required him to maintain his country's neutrality rather than declare war on Germany and Japan. His own political base, the center-left Democratic Alliance, was deeply divided on the question of Chile's involvement in the war. Chilean conservatives, many sympathetic to Franco and Mussolini, were strongly opposed to getting involved in a war that socialists, communists, and labor activists advocated. Sumner Welles traveled to Chile to see what kind of deal he could

make. Determining that Ríos was not likely to budge on the issues of most importance for Roosevelt's war policy, Welles involved himself in the internal politics of the Democratic Alliance to strengthen the pro-war forces on the left centered around Gabriel González Videla, who subsequently became the alliance's leader and was elected president in 1946. At the same time Welles applied punitive economic measures to show Ríos and Chile's business leaders that failure to find a deal would hurt the Chilean economy. The country remained bitterly divided on the issue, with pro-neutrality advocates increasingly speaking out against U.S. interference in Chile's internal affairs. Nonetheless, the balance inside Chile began to shift and when a German submarine sank a Chilean ship in the Atlantic, Ríos asked the Chilean National Congress to declare war on Germany. U.S. assistance to Chile increased, but the process had revealed to everyone the usually submerged, but nonetheless ever-present coercive aspects of the Good Neighbor Policy.<sup>20</sup>

Even when relationships between national governments were excellent, deepening U.S. involvement in local communities often led to U.S. actors entering into conflict with workers and their trade unions, government agencies with which companies or the U.S. military had to interact, as well as local religious and cultural leaders who worried about the lax morals of visiting North Americans, most of whom were increasingly unattached young men with money to spend. National leaders worked to resolve the many local conflicts that arose without fail in every country. In Brazil, U.S. authorities admonished their military personnel and business contractors to avoid behaviors that might be acceptable in the United States but which Brazilians found offensive.<sup>21</sup> Brazilian authorities, for their part, instructed local administrators and law enforcement officials to ignore, if necessary to cover up, violations of Brazilian laws by U.S.

personnel or entities.<sup>22</sup> Generally, strategic relations managed on a government-to-government level were positive, though not without annoyances for both sides. Interactions in local communities were more complicated, but, given so much depended on the personalities and interests of people meeting each for the first time, were often friendly as well as fraught.

Fredrick Pike noted that the U.S. approach to Latin America during the Good Neighbor Policy fit well with the clientelism that characterized social and political relations in many Pan American Union member states. What from one perspective reads as the mutuality of patron-client relations, from another perspective might well be understood as “deal-cutting,” the most basic operation of parliamentary democracy. Rather than either/or, both perspectives were always at play—in both north and south. There was plenty of clientelism within the United States (and there still is), and there was plenty of “deal-cutting” in Latin American countries that helped stabilize governing political coalitions, whether duly elected or not.<sup>23</sup>

Whether considered as a regime of clientelist or of reciprocal relationships (or some mix of the two), the Good Neighbor Policy did not change decades-old U.S. strategic objectives for integrating the countries of the western hemisphere into a U.S.-defined economic zone while limiting or ejecting European competitors from American markets, particularly German and British interests. After the Nazi takeover of Germany, German interests were increasingly identified as *ipso facto* security threats, whether the proprietors were coffee farmers, running a local transportation service, or were representatives of I. G. Farben or another large business prospering from its close ties to the German government. British interests were also targeted when feasible. For U.S. leaders the most positive outcome of Mexico’s nationalization of petroleum was the ejection of British oil companies from the country. Given the historic ties of



British, German, and other European businesses with their Latin American counterparts, the U.S. policy, even when aligned with the priorities of Latin American governments, was bound to cause recurrent problems that could be managed only with more deals that might make the U.S. position more acceptable.

*The Good Neighbor Policy as political dividing point*

For Roosevelt's agencies implementing the Good Neighbor Policy, the most difficult-to-manage problem remained back in the United States. Officials constantly worried that members of the U.S. Congress would discover something done in the name of the Good Neighbor Policy that Franklin Roosevelt's political enemies could use to embarrass and/or harass the administration. This problem intensified whenever opponents of the New Deal controlled one or both of the houses of the U.S. Congress (1939-1940, 1943-1944, 1947-1948). Republicans in the U.S. Congress, often supported by conservative Democrats from the U.S. South, repeatedly belittled U.S. funding for development programs as wasteful, particularly the very expensive projects in Brazil. To them it was self-evident that market forces could accomplish the goals of these programs more effectively as well as more cheaply, that is in those cases where government planning and market forces concurred in the value of a project. Conservatives predicted most projects would fail because they were politically motivated rather than grounded in market-driven needs. Opponents of the New Deal claimed that leftists and idealistic "one-worlders" who worked in government agencies had, with the Good Neighbor Policy, taken over pan-Americanism to promote socialism abroad and lay the groundwork for the introduction of socialism at home.<sup>24</sup>

U.S. race relations were a particularly touchy issue for the Franklin Roosevelt

administration. Roosevelt needed the support of southern Democrats in Congress for both his domestic and international initiatives. Southern Democrats increasingly spoke of pan-Americanism as a once-noble effort that leftists were using to promote racial equality.<sup>25</sup> Before the Second World War ended, southern Democrats and midwestern Republicans in Congress had formed an effective alliance that succeeded in cutting back economic aid to Latin America and in ending cultural exchange programs that they claimed promoted ideas contrary to “basic American values.” Funding for teaching Spanish in all U.S. primary and secondary schools was zeroed out of the federal budget, as was funding to have more U.S. high school and university students spend a year studying abroad, a program that in the 1940s was almost entirely confined to the western hemisphere.<sup>26</sup>

This political context made it near impossible for the administration to fulfill promises made in the course of the war for postwar economic assistance to Latin America. The context also led to the Roosevelt and Truman administrations increasingly shifting programs and aid away from the Pan American Union into the newly established United Nations Organization and global groups like the UNESCO or the World Health Organization. An important result of anti-New Deal rhetoric increasingly shaping the boundaries of U.S. policies in the western hemisphere was that security assistance remained the aspect of pan-Americanism around which there was the least contention within U.S. political institutions. Programs to strengthen military and police forces, also viewed favorably by most Latin American governments, grew in scope and ambition, while cultural and economic programs faltered.<sup>27</sup>

To be opposed to the New Deal inevitably meant being equally contemptuous of the Good Neighbor Policy. For conservatives and free-market ideologues, opposition to both

remains a fundamental, even existential stance persisting decades after the end of Second World War to the present moment. In the 1960s, for example, during debates inside the United States over President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, Wilhelm Röpke, economist and theorist of what came to be called "neoliberalism," attacked Kennedy's Latin American development assistance as a replay of the "failed" Good Neighbor Policy, which Röpke asserted had been a vehicle "by which the ideas and methods of collectivist policy were introduced into the world economy."<sup>28</sup> From Röpke's perspective, only the free market liberated to operate on its own terms could address the developmental and social deficiencies of countries with high levels of poverty. Government's sole responsibility should be protecting the security of citizens and their property. Government-planned development was inevitably waste, but spending on the police and military might create the conditions allowing free markets to increase productivity, ultimately leading to a higher standard of living. These ideological claims have been commonplace in the U.S. Congress since the 1930s and 1940s, when Republican senators and representatives regularly claimed that the primary purpose of the Good Neighbor Policy was to impose New Deal socialism on the free-market-loving countries of the Americas.<sup>29</sup> Republican Senator Hugh Butler from Nebraska earned many headlines denouncing the Good Neighbor Policy as a policy promoting international socialism.<sup>30</sup> Butler's reports to the U.S. Senate argued that Roosevelt's policies in Latin America had exacerbated political divisions throughout the continent and had genuine support only from a fringe group of left intellectuals. During his tours of Latin America, he met many conservatives with whom he and other Republicans forged longterm alliances with important implications for which leaders in Latin American countries U.S. officials came to trust most in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution of 1959.

For most observers outside the United States, the idea that the Good Neighbor Policy advanced world socialism instead of U.S. hegemonic interests can only be absurd and therefore easy to dismiss as sheer ideology. The definition of socialism conservative Republicanisms advanced (and continue to use) has little to do with Marxism but refers to unresolved debates going back to the mid-nineteenth century over the relation of capital, government, and civil society in the development of a bureaucratic regulatory state. In this sense, the Good Neighbor Policy needs examination as a pivotal development for the emergence of neo-liberalism, as well as a transitional moment in the expansion of U.S. global power, which was never a coherent or monolithic process given the contention of distinct sectors within the country for control of the most important national institutions. Every aspect of the New Deal, including the Good Neighbor Policy, has long been and remains the subject of vitriolic conservative attacks that have pushed liberals and some progressives into idealizing programs with complicated histories and confusing legacies.<sup>31</sup>

Over the last twenty-five years, historical writing on the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration has tried to examine the operations of New Deal programs at the local level and thus avoid the distortions accompanying polemical attack and defense. Historians have found that the same program implemented in different locations often worked for irreconcilable goals. A program that promoted racial equality in one city reinforced stricter separation of the races in another town, not necessarily far away. Like histories of New Deal domestic programs, post-Cold War literature on the Good Neighbor Policy has moved towards more indepth investigation of particular programs of the Good Neighbor Policy.<sup>32</sup> Digging more deeply into operations, despite the risks of getting lost in local detail, has led to better understanding of the many distinct

situations in which the Good Neighbor Policy played out in the dozens of U.S. government agencies and hundreds of private organizations at work across twenty countries, each with its own political, economic, and social complexities. A focus on the important but often abstractly framed questions such as the relation of cooperation and intervention has given way to studying how pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy intersected with the social, cultural, and economic realities of the diverse communities that Good Neighbor Policy programs engaged.

Pablo Palomino's recent book *The Invention of Latin American Music* explores how scholars, cultural entrepreneurs, and music lovers from across the western hemisphere used the organizational frameworks and funding that the Pan American Union offered between the two world wars to document musical traditions in the different Latin American nations. While noting divergences between the types of music played in each nation as well as similarities and the distinct ways indigenous, African, and immigrant music intersected with *criollo* Iberian heritage, the scholars and musicians Palomino discusses framed a common understanding of Latin American music that could belong to anyone with a radio, a phonograph player, or a musical instrument. Such work strengthened *americanismo* by giving conceptions of shared cultural identity material expression in the form of hemispheric cultural markets that included but did not depend upon the United States.<sup>33</sup> Eric Rutkow's *The Longest Line on the Map* examines another aspect of Pan American Union activity that relied primarily on civil society in his investigation of the decades' long effort of geographers and engineers to develop the Pan American Highway.<sup>34</sup> Both Palomino and Rutkow pay attention to the political and economic interests in the respective PAU projects they study, but both works emphasize that the men and women whose contributions the PAU mobilized operated with their own goals, usually pursued with

fervor and obstinacy. Participants in PAU programs often disagreed with each other, as well as with the governments and agencies whose funding supported their activities. These studies add to understanding better the diversity of Pan American civil society collaboration, involving a wide range of discrete topics needing more study. Business groups met under the auspices of the PAU, as did police officers, forestry officials, and public health planners. The Pan American Union fostered meetings that in retrospect seem unlikely but were featured prominently in PAU publications: feminists discussing the state of women's rights across the continent; trade unionists discussing how to better coordinate struggles with companies operating in multiple countries; leaders from African-descent and indigenous communities debating how to improve their political, economic, and social positions. These activities began before the Good Neighbor Policy, but they expanded rapidly during the 1930s as the Roosevelt administration sought to expand and solidify citizen-to-citizen contact by providing more money and more coordination. This is a picture that only detailed one-by-one examination of pan-American projects can reveal, rather than general consideration of what pan-Americanism might have been "as such." Pan-Americanism in practice was a diverse set of semi-autonomous activities. Its operations on the ground were always complicated and contradictory, destabilizing any generalizations one might make.

Rebecca Herman's book, *Cooperating with the Colossus*, examines possibly the single most costly program of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, the development of air bases across the continent between 1937 and 1945.<sup>35</sup> The development of an integrated air transportation system linking the twenty-one PAU members had long been an important goal for the U.S. government, but proved elusive as U.S. business interests were reluctant to invest in a market

that was relatively small and already dominated by European-owned aviation companies.

Entering the market would be difficult and profitable returns unlikely. In 1937, as the Roosevelt administration determined that a new world war was inevitable, the building of U.S.-controlled air bases across the western hemisphere became a top priority. The U.S. government provided secret funding to a consortium of U.S. businesses under the leadership of Pan American Airways to develop an ostensibly privately owned continental system of airports. All participants understood that the airports would be turned into U.S. military bases when war came. The governments of the host countries eagerly supported the project, but given popular opposition to any form of U.S. military presence, they required that the project be launched with fanfare as a pan-American-inspired initiative of private enterprise. In 1942, as most Pan American Union member states joined the U.S.-led coalition against Germany, the airport system quickly converted into dozens of military bases housing thousands of U.S. military personnel and civilians. Herman's study moves beyond the geopolitical determinations that initiated the project to focus on the many political, legal, social issues that accompanied the construction and operations of such a large number of U.S. military bases in countries eager for the investments but equally determined to protect their national sovereignty. Labor protection laws in Brazil, for example, on the surface were similar to the legal standards U.S. enterprises followed (or evaded) in the United States. Given distinct national histories, enforcement practices and procedures varied from country to country. More generally wherever air fields were located, U.S. business interests penetrated more deeply into the local economies, found business partners with whom they could work, and assisted in the strategic project of isolating if not eliminating already established European businesses, including many English, French, and Dutch firms, each of

which had their own entrenched local partners. Herman shows how in Brazil, Cuba, and Panamá, the relationship at the local level was sufficiently uncertain that by the end of the war, U.S. policy planners recommended turning all new military bases over to the host governments.<sup>36</sup>

Having replaced Britain as the center of the global system, the leaders of the United States at the end of World War II had returned to the idea that a power is a power only to the degree that it is prepared to act unilaterally. The idea of the “good neighbor,” to the degree that it continued to be rhetorically deployed at ceremonial occasions, lingered as a ghost of a moment that had ended. Effectively the pledge of non-intervention proffered in the 1930s no longer bound U.S. leaders, even if negotiating differences remained preferable. In the aftermath of the 1954 coup in Guatemala, Érico Veríssimo, at the time serving as director of cultural affairs at the Pan American Union, noted that in world history the exercise of raw power was nothing new or unusual, thus no serious observer of international affairs could ever have been surprised that the United States might organize and fund a plot to overthrow the government of another country. The new quality that struck him as radically different from his previous fifteen years of closely observing the United States as a world power was that U.S. representatives no longer felt any obligation to be apologetic for their actions. They had tried to negotiate with the leaders of Guatemala. No deal forthcoming, the United States acted decisively.<sup>37</sup> Leaders who resisted U.S. demands, Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala, Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, the CIA overthrew.

U.S. strategic priorities following the coups in Iran and Guatemala destabilized and devastated every part of the world, as internal political and economic conflicts turned more dangerous and destructive whenever they became a front in the Cold War. The division within the United States over the disastrous war in Vietnam returned management of international



relations to the center of U.S. politics. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. support for dictatorships became a political issue as the U.S. Congress systematically voted to end military and economic assistance to the military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina. The Reagan administration tried to reverse the situation while pursuing war in Central America and buttressing support for the brutal dictatorships of the southern cone as best it could. Because voters generally opposed supporting dictators, the Reagan administration had to reverse its initial positions and gave greater priority to the defense of “human rights.” Even if hypocritical and riddled with contradictions, the shift played a positive role in the restoration of liberal democratic government in Argentina and Chile, as well as the eventual dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa. In each case, regimes grounded in brutality expected stronger support from the Reagan and first Bush administrations than they in fact received. Domestic political considerations overcame the logic driving a particular approach to global governance. Perhaps all “policies” that governments enunciate with great fanfare usually in execution transform into a stream of tactical improvisations, filled with inconsistencies and confusions. This was certainly true of the Good Neighbor Policy.

<sup>1</sup> First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt, online at The Avalon Project: Documents in Labor, History, and Diplomacy, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, [https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th\\_century/froos1.asp](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/froos1.asp).

<sup>2</sup> “Good Neighbor Policy,” Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, online at <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/good-neighbor>.

<sup>3</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States 1881* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1882), 14.

<sup>4</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation,’” in Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 255–275; on rhetorical expressions of the relation between experience and expectation, see 257–258. Paul Ricœur developed a related conceptual framework, in which a term such as “good neighbor” when applied to foreign policy operates as a “prefiguration” that generates a variety of textual or performative configurations, many in competition to determine interpretation of a given situation. See Paul Ricœur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), see Chapter 3 in particular, “Time and Narrative: Threefold Mimesis,” 52-90. The work of Ricœur and Koselleck help make visible how relatively abstract principles can, in given situations, become determinative of action by offering a template for appropriate response. Ricœur’s analysis is limited to consideration of texts. For historians, Koselleck’s formulation has the advantage of privileging action, which of course frequently includes the production of a text or other symbolic expression.

<sup>5</sup> Elihu Root, “South American Commerce,” in Elihu Root, *Latin America and the United States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1917), 277. For a particularly clear example of how the inability of U.S. citizens to be good neighbors with each other interferes with the United States acting as a good neighbor on the global stage, see Elihu Root, “The Obligations of the United States as to Panama Canal Tolls,” in Elihu Root, *Addresses on International Subjects* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1916; originally published 1912), 207-240.

<sup>6</sup> Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Our Foreign Policy: The Democratic View,” *Foreign Affairs* 6 (July 1928), 573-586. In addition to the interventions in Latin America, the administration of Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929) had also sent military forces into China.

<sup>7</sup> For a review of Hoover’s Latin American policies, see Alan McPherson, “Herbert Hoover, Occupation Withdrawal, and the Good Neighbor Policy,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 44 (2014), 623-639; Paul Kahan, “Herbert Hoover’s Diplomacy Toward Latin America,” in *A Companion to Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover*, ed. Katherine A. S. Sibley, (John Wiley & Sons, 2014), 484-501; Alexander Deconde, “Herbert Hoover’s Good Will Tour,” *Historian* 12 (1950), 167-181.

<sup>8</sup> For three classic assessments of the Good Neighbor Policy written from liberal U.S. perspectives during the Franklin Roosevelt administration see, Graham Stuart, “The Results of the Good Neighbor Policy in Latin America,” *World Affairs* 102 (1939), 166-170; Philip Leonard Green, *Pan American Progress* (New York: Hastings House, 1942); and an educational pamphlet that the American Historical Association published in 1945, Lewis Hanke, *Is the Good Neighbor Policy a Success* [on line at [https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-14-is-the-good-neighbor-policy-a-success-\(1945\)](https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/em-14-is-the-good-neighbor-policy-a-success-(1945))].

<sup>9</sup> Particularly important contributions include Laurence Duggan, *The Americas: The Search for Hemisphere Security* (New York: Henry Holt, 1949); Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1954); Donald Dozer, *Are We Good Neighbors? Three Decades of Inter-American Relations, 1930–1960* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959); Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); Samuel G. Inman, *Inter-American Conferences, 1826–1954* (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1965); Samuel Shapiro, ed., *Cultural Factors in Inter-American Relations* (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1968); David Green, *The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Dick Steward, *Trade and Hemisphere: The Good Neighbor Policy and Reciprocal Trade* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975); Irwin F. Gellman, *Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933–1945* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); Jules Benjamin, “The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay,” *Diplomatic History* 11 (1987), 91–112; Lester D. Langley, *America and the Americas: The United States in the Western Hemisphere* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989).

<sup>10</sup> See in particular, William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1959) and *The Roots of the Modern American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social Consciousness in a Marketplace Society* (New York: Random House, 1969); Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) and *Century of War: Politics, Conflicts, and Society since 1914* (New York: New Press, 1988).

<sup>11</sup> Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy*, op. cit. David A. Lake in *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988) reviews the slow process by which the direction of trade policy shifted from business associations to the national government. For Lake, Roosevelt’s focus on negotiating reciprocal trade agreements was the determining shift, with twenty-two agreements signed between 1934 and 1941, ten of which were made with Latin American nations. The most extensive reciprocal trade agreements were with the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Brazil, all operative by 1936. These agreements made trade policy a matter of continuous negotiation between the governments of the nations involved, subordinating market processes to achieving policy goals that satisfied the political leaders of the countries signing reciprocal trade agreements (204–212). See also, Paul Varg, “The Economic Side of the Good Neighbor Policy: The Reciprocal Trade Program and South America,” *Pacific Historical Review* 45 (1976), 47–12, and Dick Steward, *Trade and Hemisphere: The Good Neighbor Policy and Reciprocal Trade* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1975).

<sup>12</sup> On U.S. “involvement” in the 1933 Cuban revolution, see Justo Carrillo, *Cuba 1933: Students, Yankees, and Soldiers* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), Ricardo Adam y Silva, *La Gran Mentira 4 Septiembre 1933* (Santo Domingo: Editora Corripio, 1986), Enrique Ros, *La Revolución de 1933* (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 2005) and Luis E. Aguilar, *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). Correspondence between Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull while Welles was in Cuba evaluating the situation has been published in *The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Aviva Chomsky et al. (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 283–287. One of the ironies of the situation in Cuba was that Ramon San Martín Grau, a man U.S. officials distrusted in 1933 by 1940 was the Cuban leader they wanted most to be elected president.

<sup>13</sup> On U.S.-Mexico relations during nationalization of the petroleum industry, see Alan Knight, *U.S.-Mexican Relations, 1910-1940: An Interpretation* (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987), Stephen R. Niblo, *War, Diplomacy, and Development: United States-Mexican Relations, 1938-1945* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1995); Bianca Torres Ramírez, *Historia de la Revolución Mexicana, 1940-1952: México en la segunda guerra mundial* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979); Lorenzo Myer, “La institucionalización del nuevo régimen,” in *Historia general de México* (Mexico: El Colegio de México, 2000), 846-863, and Lorenzo Meyer, “De la estabilidad al cambio,” *ibid.*, 926-932. The U.S. oil companies operating in Mexico were smaller family-owned businesses whose limited capital holdings rendered their operations uncompetitive in the more technologically intensive U.S. petroleum market. The owners of these oil companies, probably never sympathetic to the goals of the New Deal, felt that the Roosevelt administration had sacrificed their interests to the benefit of Standard Oil and other oil monopolies. Independent oil producers were to play an important role in the rightward, neoliberal shift of the Republican Party, a shift that included the firm conviction that the Good Neighbor Policy had promoted socialism.

<sup>14</sup> See Andrew Crawley, *Somoza and Roosevelt: Good Neighbour Diplomacy in Nicaragua, 1933-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) and Eric Paul Roorda, *The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945* (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1998).

<sup>15</sup> Even though Argentina negotiated a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States in 1941, in large part as protection against the economic destabilization the Second World War was causing.

<sup>16</sup> On U.S.-Argentina relations in 1930s and 1940s, see Stanley E. Hilton, “Argentine Neutrality, September 1939-June 1940: A Re-Examination,” *The Americas* 22 (1966), 227-257; Michael J. Francis, *The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); C. A. MacDonald, “The Politics of Intervention: The United States and Argentina, 1941-1946,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 12 (1980), 365-396; Bryce Wood, *The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 1-144; Joseph S. Tulchin, *Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship* (Boston: Twayne, 1990), Ronald C. Newman, *The “Nazi Menace” in Argentina, 1931-1947* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992); Gisela Cramer, “Argentine Riddle: The Pinedo Plan of 1940 and the Political Economy of the Early War Years,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 30 (1998), 519-550.

<sup>17</sup> On the intersection of U.S. and Brazilian policymaking between 1938 and 1945, see Stanley E. Hilton, “Vargas and Brazilian Economic Development, 1930-1945: A Reappraisal of his Attitude Toward Industrialization and Planning,” *Journal of Economic History* 35 (1975), 754-778; Stanley E. Hilton, “Brazilian Diplomacy and the Washington-Rio de Janeiro ‘Axis’ During the World War II Era,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 59 (1979), 201-231; Gerson Moura, *Autonomia na Dependência: A Política Externa Brasileira de 1935 a 1942* (Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira, 1980); Frank D. McCann, *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); Francisco Luiz Corsi, *Estado Novo: Política Externa e Projeto Nacional* (São Paulo: Editora Unesp/Fapesp, 1999). For a broader analysis of U.S. and Latin American priorities 1937-1945, see R. A. Humphreys, *Latin America and the Second World War* (London: Athlone, 1981); David Rock, ed., *Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Gerald K. Haines, “Under the Eagle’s Wing: The Franklin Roosevelt Administration Forges an American Hemisphere,” *Diplomatic History* 1 (1977), 373-388.

<sup>18</sup> George W. Grayson, *The United States and Mexico: Patterns of Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1984), 27-35; Jorge I. Domínguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro, *The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2001). As is well known, U.S. officials supported Cárdenas's consolidation of power and decision making and increased restrictions on popular movements and labor organizing, a shift towards a more institutionalized, bureaucratic, and business-oriented form of governance that characterized the administration of Manuel Ávila Camacho. Most historians agree that this shift grew from internal Mexican political dynamics, see, for example, Alan Knight, "The End of the Mexican Revolution?: From Cárdenas to Ávila Camacho, 1937-1941," in *Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938-1968*, eds. Paul Gillingham and Benjamin Smith (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2014), 47-69.

<sup>19</sup> For the complexity of negotiations with Panamá's government during the Good Neighbor Policy years, see Lester D. Langley, "The World Crisis and the Good Neighbor Policy in Panama, 1936-1941," *The Americas* 24 (1967), 137-152.

<sup>20</sup> An excellent discussion of U.S. pressure on Chile and its longer-term effects, with a focus on U.S. objectives can be found in Michael J. Francis, *The Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile During World War II* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977). For a Chilean historical perspective, see Hamish Stewart Stokes, *La segunda guerra mundial 1939-1945: Repercusiones internacionales y consecuencias en Chile* (Concepción: Stokes, Valdés Urrutia y García Valenzuela, 1993).

<sup>21</sup> See Rebecca Herman, *Cooperating with the Colossus: A Social and Political History of U.S. Military Bases in World War II Latin America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022). Herman finds similar, but somewhat less successful efforts in Cuba and Panamá of national authorities attempting to manage local complaints.

<sup>22</sup> Herman found that files for wartime labor complaints had to be sent to Rio de Janeiro, where they were destroyed. Her research benefitted from the discovery of a government archive in Belem that had kept its files.

<sup>23</sup> Fredrick B. Pike, *The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 137-162. Pike argues that Latin American leaders distrusted the bureaucratic apparatuses of the U.S. state but trusted Franklin Roosevelt as a man willing to be in charge, to act as the harmonizing focus of otherwise conflicting individual demands on society by dispensing or withholding favors. Roosevelt had an "ability to deal commandingly, even peremptorily, with others without diminishing their sense of *dignidad*" (137).

<sup>24</sup> See, as an example of conservative members of Congress presenting a quasi-historical interpretation of U.S. expenditures in Brazil and other countries, U.S., Congress, House, Hearings, Appropriations Committee, National War Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1944 (Washington, D.C., 1945), 250ff.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. agencies funded academic study of race relations in Latin American countries and helped promote discussion within the United States of "racial democracy" in Brazil and other countries. See Richard Cándida Smith, *Improvised Continent: Pan-Americanism and Cultural Exchange* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 163-168.

<sup>26</sup> Liping Bu, "Educational Exchange and Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War," *Journal of American Studies* 33 (1999), 393-415; Cándida Smith, *Improvised Continent*, 169-183. The programs most immune to political interference had constituencies that conservatives were reluctant to attack—on the one hand, scholarly, scientific, legal, and commercial associations that brought together businessmen and professionals with similar interests from across the western hemisphere to work on joint projects; on the other hand, collaborative inter-American military and security projects.

<sup>27</sup> On U.S. efforts to reform Brazilian labor practices along North American lines, see Eduardo José Affonso, “Para Norte-Americano Ver: Adidos Trabalhistas e Operários Brasileiros (1943/1952),” Ph.D. dissertation, University of São Paulo, 2011, 80–132; for a more general discussion of U.S. labor policies in Latin America between 1940 and 1960, see Robert J. Alexander, “Labor and Inter-American Relations,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 334 (1961), 41–53. On increases in police programs, see Martha K. Huggins, *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998); and Rodrigo Patto Sá Motta, “Modernizing Repression: USAID and the Brazilian Police,” *Revista Brasileira de História* 30 (2010), 235–262.

<sup>28</sup> Wilhelm Röpke, “Washington’s Economics: A German Scholar Sees Nation Moving into Fiscal Socialism,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 1, 1963.

<sup>29</sup> For a general discussion of congressional opposition to the Good Neighbor Policy, see Claude C. Erb, “Prelude to Point Four: The Institute of Inter-American Affairs,” *Diplomatic History* 9 (1985), 249-269.

<sup>30</sup> Justus F. Paul, “Senator Hugh Butler and Aid to Latin America, 1943-1944,” *South Dakota History* 8 (Winter 1977): 34-45. The fullest expression of Butler’s subsequently influential position can be found in *Expenditures and commitments by the United States government in or for Latin America. Report by Hon. Hugh Butler, relative to expenditures by the United States in or for Latin America and the reply to such report made by Hon. Kenneth McKellar, together with accompanying papers from the heads of departments verifying same* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943; available online at HathiTrust). See also reporting on public debate over Butler’s claims in the *New York Times*, 27 November 1943, p. 51; 13 December 1943, p. 1; 14 December 1943, p. 18; 20 January 1944, p. 5; 21 January 1944, p. 4. Critics of the Good Neighbor Policy have often been lumped with the isolationists and pro-German sympathizers within the United States. The situation was more complicated as so-called most “isolationists” were not opposed to U.S. involvement with the world, but argued that the interests of businesses and private citizens should direct those involvements rather than state interests. Many, like Senator Butler opposed alliance with the United Kingdom, which they viewed as a commercial and financial rival. See Geoffrey S. Smith, “Isolationism, the Devil, and the Advent of the Second World War: Variations on a Theme,” *International History Review* 4 (1982), 55-89.

<sup>31</sup> See the website “The Living New Deal” (<https://livingnewdeal.org/>) for an overview of efforts to turn study and commemoration of the New Deal into a springboard for a contemporary progressive counterattack on neoliberal policies and ideas. Foreign policy has not yet been a subject treated on the site. A search for “pan-Americanism” yields no entries, the “Good Neighbor Policy” is also missing.

<sup>32</sup> Recent additions to the literature in English on the Good Neighbor Policy include: Richard Cándida Smith, *Improvised Continent*, op. cit.; Alexandre Busko Valim, *Brazil, the United States, and the Good Neighbor Policy: The Triumph of Persuasion during World War II* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019); Tizoc Chávez, “The One Bright Spot”: Presidential Personal Diplomacy and the Good Neighbor Policy,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 51 (2021), 290-326; Adam Ratzlaff, “Birds of a Feather?: Lessons on U.S. Cultural Diplomacy from Walt Disney during the Good Neighbor Policy,” *International Journal of Cultural Policy* (2022), 1-16. See also, discussed below, Pablo Palomino, *The Invention of Latin American Music*, Eric Rutkow, *The Longest Line on the Map*, and Rebecca Herman, *Cooperating with the Colossus*.

<sup>33</sup> Pablo Palomino, *The Invention of Latin American Music: A Transnational History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

<sup>34</sup> Eric Rutkow, *The Longest Line on the Map: The United States, the Pan-American Highway, and the Quest to Link the Americas* (New York: Scribner’s, 2019).

<sup>35</sup> Herman, *Cooperating with the Colossus*, op. cit.

<sup>36</sup> Conflict undoubtedly was a factor in the decision, but we should be careful not to think solely in terms of antagonism as the default state. In a report on the closing of U.S. facilities in Recife, *Life* magazine's reporters noted that U.S. officials were concerned with how easily U.S. personnel enjoyed life in Brazil, with an unusually high number choosing to stay rather than return home ("In Recife, Brazil," *Life* 30 April 1945).

<sup>37</sup> Erico Verissimo, *Solo de clarineta* (Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1973), 1:273, 292.